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Robert E. Hall
The essays in this volume are the product of the NBER'S Project on
Inflation and reflect a dozen diverse views on one of the nation's central
economic problems. Our emphasis here is on diagnosis of the causes of
inflation and a description of the effects of inflation, not on specific policy
recommendations to end inflation. Many of us have views on what to do
about inflation and have not hesitated to speak up in public about those
views, but our papers here are not advocating those views. Instead, we
are trying to illuminate some of the economic and political processes
involving inflation.
The twelve papers in this volume fall into four general categories. Two
papers—those of Robert J. Gordon and Thomas J. Sargent—find dra-
matically different answers to the central question of what would happen
to output and employment if inflation were brought to an end. Two other
papers deal with the types of change in economic institutions that might
contribute to limiting inflation. Robert J. Barro points to the need for a
monetary standard that stabilizes some dollar-denominated quantity in
the economy as the key feature of an economy with stable prices. Robert
E. Hall pursues this idea, presenting an example of a monetary standard
which borrows from the gold standard yet tries to avoid some of its
pitfalls. Seven of the remaining papers deal with one or another way that
inflation has changed the economy or how the economy has reacted to
inflation. Jeremy I. Bulow reports, surprisingly, that inflation has
brought large capital gains to the private pension system. Dennis W.
Carlton argues that inflation has changed the character of certain types of
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markets, encouraging standardized products and limiting the marketing
of highly specialized products. Martin Feldstein investigates the joint
effects of inflation and the tax system on the incentives for capital accu-
mulation. Stanley Fischer shows that the private economy has adapted
partially to inflation by changing the form of financial instruments like
mortgages and by indexing some forms of income. Jacob A. Frenkel
discusses the relation between domestic monetary instability, inflation,
and the international value of the dollar. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., a
political scientist, shows how the public rates the problem of inflation
compared to other social problems and how this rating responds to the
actual state of the economy. Jeremy I. Bulow and John B. Shoven take a
look at the distortions that inflation brings to the measurement of the
earnings of corporations; they conclude that correction of the distortion
actually raises corporate earnings. Finally, in a category of its own is Alan
S. Blinder's examination of the volatile inflation of the 1970s and its
relation to shocks in energy and food markets.
The papers by Gordon and by Sargent provide an interesting contrast.
Both look to historical data on disinflation to draw conclusions about the
likely effects of a move against inflation today. But they reach dramati-
cally different conclusions. Gordon's paper, "Why Stopping Inflation
May Be Costly: Evidence from Fourteen Historical Episodes," warns
that ending inflation could decrease output and increase unemployment.
His evidence, from a study of historical episodes in the United States,
Germany, Switzerland, France, Japan, Italy, Brazil, and Israel, is not
unanimous, however. Not every episode shows that ending inflation has
an adverse effect on employment. He points out that there was a spec-
tacular turnaround in inflation just after World War I in the United
States, when inflation dropped from 20% to minus 26% in just a year and
a half. The end of the inflation after World War II was also reasonably
favorable, accompanied as it was by only a relatively mild recession. But
more recent experience in the United States indicates that recessions
have weak anti-inflationary effects. "The puzzling aspect of 1970-71 is
the failure of the recession, which brought the level of real output from 4
percent above trend to 2.5% below trend, to have any effect at all in
dampening inflation." Gordon finds that other countries too have suc-
ceeded in limiting recent bursts of inflation only by tolerating reduced
output and employment. Germany has pursued a successful anti-inflation
policy, says Gordon, but "the cost of this policy was relatively slow
output growth of only 2.3% between 1973 and 1979, compared to 2.8% in
the United States." Earlier, German growth had been well above United
States growth. And in Switzerland, according to Gordon, literal price
stability was achieved in the 1970s "by creating a veritable depression in
real output." There are a few episodes during which inflation has beenIntroduction
brought under control without deep recession: France and Italy in the
mid-1960s and Japan in the late 1970s. Gordon concludes that contrac-
tions in demand, especially "cold turkey" policies, bring substantial
likelihood of depressed employment and output, though they will suc-
ceed in cooling inflation.
In Sargent's paper, "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," a review of
history indicates the opposite conclusion. Inflation raged in four Euro-
pean nations—Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany—in the after-
math of World War I. Once-and-for-all fiscal reforms proved to be the
key to successful control of inflation in all four cases. These episodes are
laboratories for studying changes in policy regimes and shed a good deal
of light on the kind of policy that could eliminate current United States
inflation, even though it is nowhere near as serious as the inflations
studied here.
The major common features in the four cases are: (1) Each country
persistently ran enormous budget deficits during the inflations. (2) De-
liberate and drastic fiscal and monetary measures ended the hyperinfla-
tions almost overnight. (3) There were large increases in the money stock
in the months and years after rapid inflation ended. This evidence coun-
ters Gordon's view, a view that has become common among economists:
Inflation has a stubborn, self-sustaining momentum, not susceptible to
cure by conventional measures of monetary and fiscal restraint. In this
view, eradicating inflation would have a prohibitively high cost in wide-
spread and sustained unemployment. Sargent favors an alternative view,
associated with the hypothesis of rational expectations, that denies that
there is any inherent momentum in the process of inflation. Were the
government to adopt a comprehensive change in fiscal and monetary
policy, inflation could end quickly, as it did in the four countries studied,
according to Sargent's thinking.
Barro's and Hall's papers are complementary, on the other hand.
Barro spells out the requirements for price stability in general terms, and
Hall provides a quite specific example of the type of stable system Barro
has in mind. Barro's paper, "United States Inflation and the Choice of
Monetary Standard," points out that money growth and inflation are
strongly positively correlated over long periods of time but are less
closely associated from year to year. One source of short-run divergence
between money and prices is a shift in the demand for money that is
induced by a change in inflationary expectations. Variations in long-term
inflationary expectations are mirrored in observable long-term interest
rates, and these rates have become far more volatile in recent years.
Barro estimates that each percentage point movement in these rates is
associated—via higher monetary velocity—with a rise of about four
percentage points in the inflation rate. The heightened volatility of in-
terest rates and underlying expectations of money and price changeRobert E. Hall
reflects a movement away from a regime that provided some restraint on
long-run monetary expansion. Some remnants of the gold standard and
fixed exchange rates imposed these constraints even as recently as 1971.
Under the present setup with paper money, future money and prices
depend on the cumulated discretion of the Federal Reserve—the system
possesses no nominal anchor, says Barro.
Commodity standards like the gold standard provide a nominal anchor
by pegging the prices of particular goods. Although the commodity base
can be expanded beyond gold, the limited potential coverage would allow
for substantial variations in the general price level. The gold standard
also entails direct resource costs. Further, at least under a fractional-
reserve banking system, the history of gold standards indicates substan-
tial room for economic contractions.
A monetary constitution that precommits the long-term path of nomi-
nal aggregates avoids many of the problems of commodity standards.
Milton Friedman's constant-growth-rate rule is a regime of this type.
What is key is not the constancy of the growth rate or the particular
number for the rate or the precise definition of the monetary aggregate,
but rather the commitment to and hence anchor on some future nominal
values. We have substantial historical experience with regimes with
nominal anchors that are of the gold standard type, but not with mone-
tary constitutions in a paper money environment.
Hall's paper, "Explorations in the Gold Standard and Related Policies
for Stabilizing the Dollar," pursues the idea of a nominal anchor achieved
through a commodity standard. His paper explores the good and bad
features of the gold standard and its generalization, the commodity
standard, without taking a stand for or against the idea. A properly
managed commodity standard emerges as a potential competitor to a
properly managed fiat money system as a way to achieve price stability.
Both systems require good management. Simply switching from our
existing badly managed fiat money to a badly managed commodity stan-
dard might well be a step backward.
Hall reports that during the years of the gold standard in the United
States (1879-1914), inflation was kept to reasonable levels but cumulated
over decades so that the long-run purchasing power of the dollar declined
by 40%. The gold standard does not meet the requirement of long-run
stabilization of the real value of the dollar. Moreover, recent instability in
the world gold market would have brought alternating periods of severe
inflation and deflation had the United States been on the gold standard.
Hall finds that an acceptable commodity standard could be based on a
package of several commodities, chosen so that the historical association
of the price of the package and the cost of living has been close. An
example of such a package contains ammonium nitrate, copper, alumi-
num, and plywood. But even with the best choice of a commodityIntroduction
standard, it is necessary to redefine the standard periodically. Monthly
changes in the commodity content of the dollar could be used according
to a fixed rule. Such a rule can promise almost exact long-run stability in
the cost of living. Whatever type of commodity standard is adopted, it
would function more effectively if the government did not hold reserves
of the commodity. Manipulation of reserves and intervention in com-
modity markets defeat the anti-inflationary purpose of the commodity
standard. Finally, Hall comments that, although a good commodity
standard would have been far superior to the actual monetary policy of
the past two decades, better management of the existing system based on
fiat money might have done as well or better. The commodity standard is
not inherently superior to fiat money as a way to stabilize the cost of
living. The commodity standard is just as subject to abuse as is the
existing system.
Among the papers dealing with the impact of inflation on the workings
of the United States economy, Jeremy Bulow's "The Effect of Inflation
on the Private Pension System" is one of the most surprising. Private
pension plans are accumulating surpluses of tens of billions of dollars,
thanks to inflation. According to Bulow, inflation raises the interest rates
earned by pension funds, but does not raise the pensions of most retired
workers. As a result, "Workers have lost out to both firms and the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation." Most private pensions are set in
dollar terms at the time of retirement and do not rise with inflation after
that time, in contrast to social security benefits. Bulow finds that, because
of the enormous expense involved, it is unlikely that private pensions will
be indexed to inflation in the future. Even indexing for 4 or 5% inflation,
far below current rates, "could easily double the value of a plan's vested
benefits." To finance indexing of benefits, either current workers would
have to accept a large reduction in wages or retirees would have to settle
for much smaller initial pensions.
Dennis Carlton's paper, "The Disruptive Effect of Inflation on the
Organization of Markets," asks what has happened to the organization
and efficiency of individual markets in the United States under the
transition to rapid inflation over the past two decades. Carlton suggests
that inflation has pushed markets toward uniform products traded in
highly organized markets and away from custom products. He shows that
businesses relied heavily on unchanging prices for individual products in
the bygone era of a stable dollar. In today's economy, all prices must be
revised frequently. Customers must spend more effort in gathering in-
formation about prices. Carlton pointed to the explosion in the number
and level of activity of organized commodity markets in the years since
inflation became a serious problem. The number of contracts traded in
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange rose by a factor of nearly 20 between
1955 and 1978, according to Carlton. He concludes that the "disruptionRobert E. Hall
of transaction, consumption, and production patterns . . . helps explain
the hostility the public justly holds towards inflation."
Martin Feldstein's "Inflation, Capital Taxation, and Monetary Policy"
points out the adverse effects on the United States economy of the
interaction between inflation and tax rules. Because accounting defini-
tions embodied in tax laws do not measure income flows appropriately
under inflation, the effective tax rate on the earnings of capital has risen
dramatically over the past decade. Feldstein gives the example of an
individual in the 30% marginal tax bracket who earned 12% interest in
1979. After taxes, the apparent earnings are 8.4%, but after adjusting for
the diminished value of the dollar, the real after-tax earnings are minus
4.6%. Feldstein observes, "The small saver was thus penalized rather
than rewarded for attempting to save."
Feldstein notes the decline in the fraction of total national income
devoted to net investment in nonresidential capital and blames it in large
part on the increases in effective tax rates on capital brought about by
inflation. He also observes that high nominal interest rates associated
with inflation may have confused monetary policymakers into thinking
that policy was contractionary when in fact it was quite inflationary.
Stanley Fischer's "Adapting to Inflation in the United States Econ-
omy" shows that the past decade has seen the United States economy
undergo a variety of adjustments to high and variable inflation. The
major adjustments are in the financial sector, particularly in mortgage
financing. New mortgage instruments have been introduced, particularly
in California: the graduated payment mortgage (GPM), the variable rate
mortgage (VRM), and the rollover mortgage. Half the FHA mortgage
applications in California in 1979 were for GPMS. The secondary market
for mortgages is now well established as a major source of funds for the
mortgage-lending institutions. Money market certificates and other new
liabilities have substantially reduced the probability of future episodes of
disintermediation.
The Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 will eliminate interest ceilings by 1986 and overrides state usury
statutes. Corporations have shifted to debt from equity financing and
have shortened the maturity of their outstanding debt. There is some
indexing of life insurance contracts but very little indexing of private
pensions. There has been increasing indexation of labor contracts, but
cost of living clauses cover only a small part of the labor force. The federal
government has made few adjustments to inflation aside from indexation
of social security benefits and some other transfer payments. In particu-
lar, inflation substantially affects the taxation of capital.
Complete indexation would make the economy virtually impervious to
inflations caused purely by expansion of the money supply and would
make the inflation rate fall more rapidly in response to disinflationaryIntroduction
policy (as well as rise more rapidly in response to inflationary policy). But
an economy that is only partially indexed, as is the United States econ-
omy, may be more seriously affected by inflation than one that is not
indexed at all. In a partially indexed economy, the burden of adjustment
to inflation is spread more unevenly than in a nonindexed economy,
according to Fischer's analysis.
Jacob A. Frenkel's "United States Inflation and the Dollar" asks
whether a return to a fixed exchange rate would eliminate the wild swings
in the international value of the dollar that have contributed to inflation
since 1973. In Frenkel's view, the foreign exchange market is like the
stock market, responding instantly to all types of new information,
including changing expectations about United States policy and the poli-
cies of other affluent nations. Restoration of the purchasing power of the
dollar at home would strengthen the external value of the dollar and limit
its fluctuations. Moreover, says Frenkel, a floating exchange rate would
help insulate the United States from misguided foreign monetary poli-
cies.
Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., in his "Public Concern about Inflation and
Unemployment in the United States: Trends, Correlates, and Political
Implications" points out that not since the Great Depression of the 1930s
and the immediate post-World War II reconversion scare has the state of
the economy occupied such a salient place on the public agenda. In every
year since the United States withdrawal from Vietnam more than 70% of
the American public had identified inflation or unemployment as "the
most important problem facing the country today."
Hibbs's paper analyzes opinion poll data on the public's relative con-
cern about inflation and unemployment over the period from 1970 to
1980. He investigates trends and fluctuations in public concern about
these problems in the light of recent macroeconomic events. The analysis
shows that public opinion responds in a systematic way to macroeco-
nomic developments: high and rising rates of inflation cause upward
movements in the public's concern about inflation relative to unemploy-
ment, and rising unemployment rates cause upward movements in the
public's concern about unemployment relative to inflation. The opinion
data indicate that when unemployment is stable, a solid majority of the
public typically is more concerned about inflation than unemployment if
inflation is running higher than 5%.
Hibbs also discusses the political implications of public reactions to
inflation and unemployment. His evidence shows that macroeconomic
performance systematically affects mass political support for the Presi-
dent. Finally, according to Hibbs, opinion data show that although the
public agrees with the economics profession's diagnosis of the proximate
sources of inflation (excessive monetary growth rates stemming in part
from high deficits), the public's preferred policy response is wage andRobert E. Hall
price controls, even if this means real wage sacrifices.
Jeremy I. Bulow's joint paper with John B. Shoven, "Inflation, Corpo-
rate Profits, and the Rate of Return Capital," looks at the distorting
effect of inflation on measured profits. A common view holds that the
accounting procedures of corporations overstate true profits under infla-
tion. Not so, say Bulow and Shoven. True, inflation enlarges reported
profits by depressing depreciation deductions below their proper eco-
nomic level, but there is an equally important bias from inflation in the
opposite direction. When prices are rising, corporations repay their debts
in dollars of reduced value, and this reduction adds to their true economic
profits. According to Bulow and Shoven, corporate profits reported by
the government for the years since 1973 "have understated our real
current cost income figures by a total of about $160 billion."
Alan S. Blinder's "The Anatomy of Double-Digit Inflation in the
1970s" finds that the episodes of double-digit inflation in 1974 and 1979-
80 have much in common: both were precipitated by food and energy
shocks, and both were accompanied by substantial changes in relative
prices. The dramatic acceleration of inflation between 1972 and 1974 can
be traced mainly to three shocks—rising food prices, rising energy prices,
and the end of the Nixon wage-price controls program—each of which
required rapid adjustments of some relative prices. The equally dramatic
deceleration of inflation between 1974 and 1976 can be traced to the
simple fact that the three factors just named were not repeated. In other
words, double-digit inflation went away by itself.
Blinder finds that the state of demand had little to do with either the
acceleration or the deceleration of inflation between 1972 and 1976. This
is not to say that aggregate demand management was irrelevant to
inflation, but only that its effects were minor compared to the supply
shocks. While the rate of inflation as measured in the CPI rose about nine
percentage points between 1977 and early 1980, the baseline or under-
lying rate may have risen by as little as three percentage points. The rest
of the inflationary acceleration came from special factors. The initial
impetus for accelerating inflation in 1978 came mainly from the food
sector, with some help from mortgage interest rates. The further accel-
eration into the double-digit range in 1979 mainly reflected soaring
energy prices and, once again, rising mortgage rates. Finally, mortgage
interest carried the ball almost by itself in early 1980.
Blinder emphasizes that the 1970s really were different from the 1950s
and 1960s. Energy shocks are quite clearly a product of the post-oPEC
world. Food shocks are not new, but we somehow managed to get away
without them in the 1950s and 1960s. The role of special factors in the
recent burst of inflation suggests that inflation will spend itself naturally.
It thus seems reasonable to expect a substantial slowing of inflation even
without contractionary monetary and fiscal policies.Introduction
The volume as a whole is not an encyclopedia on inflation. We found
we had very little to say, for example, on one of the central aspects of
inflation in the longer run, the behavior of the money wage rate. Instead,
we offer twelve essays on aspects of the problem we do feel we under-
stand.